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Abstract John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness (2012) introduces several powerful
arguments in favour of a novel and surprising thesis: the best way to realize Rawls’s
principles of justice is a free market society, rather than the arrangements that Rawls
himself believed would best promote justice. In this paper, I adduce three arguments
against Tomasi. First, I suggest that his view rests on a faulty understanding of what
constitutes conventional property rights. Second, I argue that many market solutions
generate choices which are not valuable ones for the agent to have to make. Third, I
show that many choices created by the market systems Tomasi favours create the
illusion that citizens are making their own choices when in fact they are not. I
suggest that taken together these three arguments are sufficient to defend Rawlsian
institutional arrangements against Tomasi’s challenge.
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Introduction
Recent debates in political theory appear to suggest that the primary question of
politics is the distribution of various socially produced goods. The views of
egalitarians, sufficientarians and prioritraians (and of course responsibility sensitive
prioritarians, shift sufficientarians and any number of hybrid views) offer an array of
possible metrics for ranking distributive outcomes (see, for instance, Parfit 1997;
Shields 2012; Temkin 2003). However, while these distributive questions are
obviously important, they do not constitute the whole of politics. Politics is also the
study of how these various goods are produced and political theorists had better
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come up with accounts of which mode of production is most normatively desirable
if they expect to offer a complete account of the conditions of a just society.
In his recent work, Free Market Fairness (2012), John Tomasi addresses this
question of production and provides a powerful defence of market capitalism.
While Tomasi’s argument draws upon the distributional effects of capitalism it
cannot be reduced to a distributional claim. Markets are to be commended not
(merely) because they allocate goods in a fair and just manner, or because they
tend to enlarge the total stock of goods. Instead, Tomasi defends market societies
on the basis that they better enable citizens to become responsible self-authors. In
this way, Tomasi offers a radically different defence of market economics from
those that are familiar within the literature. Standardly, defences of markets have
come from libertarians, who endorse the claim that markets are necessary for the
just distribution of goods since redistribution violates people’s rights, or from
classical liberals who argue that markets are the only efficient way to govern the
incredible complexity of modern social life.1 In contrast, Tomasi’s defence of
markets from self-governance draws upon ideals most commonly associated with
left wing modes of production. Most notably, Tomasi suggests that a free market
can be justified by reference to the moral ideal of justice as fairness developed by
Rawls (1971). The central core of Tomasi’s argument is that market-based
societies allow individuals to develop as independent agents, and in so doing
develop their interest in the two Rawlsian moral powers, the Reasonable and the
Rational.
In this paper I assess the link between markets and political agency. I suggest that
several of Tomasi’s arguments are persuasive, in particular the link between
entrepreneurship and political development. However, I also suggest that the link
between markets and agency is less close than Tomasi believes. I outline several
reasons to think that often a market solution will undermine the ability of citizens to
develop as citizens, and explore the connotations of these arguments for thinking
about which institutions best realise justice.
In brief, I argue that a social safety-net including (but not limited to) universal
provision of healthcare, education and a basic income cannot generally be
considered a threat to citizens’ abilities to live independent and autonomous lives.
The result of this argument is to suggest that while Tomasi’s arguments are rich and
interesting, they do not provide support for a laissez-faire economy. Instead, they
suggest that the most promising forms of economic production are those that
combine a culture of entrepreneurship and economic growth with state-based
institutions to reduce the need to make choices in certain domains. Before outlining
these substantive arguments, I briefly counter a mistaken attack by Tomasi on a
widely held liberal-egalitarian conception of property rights. The purpose of this
discussion is to outline the scope and status of economic liberties of ownership
compared to other basic liberties such as freedom of association or the right to
bodily integrity or the right to vote.
1 The classic defence of the rights-based approach is Robert Nozick, Anarchy State and Utopia (1974).
The argument from social complexity is most notably associated with Friedrich Hayek.
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Property Rights and the Basic Liberties
A prominent defence of free markets begins with a natural conception of property
rights. Lockeans such as Robert Nozick argue that humans can come to have moral
claims upon pieces of the external world and that the existence of these rights provides
a powerful reason to oppose state redistribution of wealth (Nozick 1974). The
Lockean account rests these property rights upon rights individuals have of self-
ownership. On this account individuals acquire property rights via the application of
their owned labour, and can rightfully claim the fruits of this labour. This account has
been subjected to two broad kinds of critique. One rebuttal suggests that while
individuals are indeed self-owners, this moral fact does not support free market
politics. This reply, in different ways, is offered by left libertarians such as Otsuka
(2005), Steiner (1977), and by Cohen (1986). The second response, offered by many
liberal egalitarians, is to suggest that whatever other natural rights people might have,
they cannot possess such claims over the external world. This is because property is a
social convention, and it makes no sense to claim a pre-societal right to property.
Interestingly, Tomasi broadly endorses this liberal egalitarian critique of Lockean
libertarianism. However he denies that its rejection has the salience social democrats
usually claim. His target in this argument is primarily Murphy and Nagel’s Myth of
Ownership (2002). Murphy and Nagel claim that since property is conventional, no
tax regime could conceivably violate property rights. On their view any individual’s
claim on property is to their post-tax, rather than pre-tax income. This is because
taxes are themselves part of the conventions which create and sustain property rights,
‘private property is a legal convention, defined in part by looking at the tax system,
therefore the tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its impact on private
property, conceived as something that has independent existence and validity’
(Murphy and Nagel 2002, p. 6). Tomasi disagrees with this analysis. He argues that
there is no relevant difference between property rights and other basic rights. The
worry Tomasi raises with Murphy and Nagel’s view is that all basic liberties are
socially constructed rules (Tomasi 2012, p. 70). Given this, he argues that Murphy
and Nagel are committed to the absurd suggestion that if tax laws cannot violate
property rights then no laws can ever violate citizens’ basic rights.
However, I believe Tomasi misunderstands Murphy and Nagel. One problem with
Tomasi’s response is that he places a good deal of weight on the observation that on
a market democratic conception property rights need not be absolute. He writes ‘for
us the important point is that when applied to nonabsolutist defences of thick
economic liberty, this argument from legal convention quickly disappears’ (Tomasi
2012, p. 70). Indeed, Tomasi appears to suggest that libertarians are committed to
treating property rights as absolutes, writing ‘if strict libertarians count property
rights as absolutes, market democracy does not think of the economic liberties in this
way’ (Tomasi 2012, p. 90). However, the distinction between absolute and defeasible
property rights is something of a red herring in this debate. There is nothing in the
libertarian account which commits them to believing that in being natural and
grounded in self-ownership property rights should be therefore be absolute. Indeed,
even Nozick who is the target of Tomasi’s above comment considers including
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‘catastrophe’ clause which allows bad consequences of sufficient weight to override
legitimate property claims (Nozick 1974, p. 30). Many right and left libertarians
permit the overriding of property claims in much less dire circumstances.2
Instead of distinguishing between absolute and defeasible property rights, the
proper distinction between natural rights theorists and conventional theorists is
whether a property claim is an input into deciding which scheme of property laws to
enforce or if it is purely an output of these laws. To illustrate the second
(conventionalist) possibility, consider an example of a gatherer tribe picking berries.
This tribe lives near a single large berry bush. While the berry bush can provide
enough for all, its supplies are not abundant. Thus the tribe must come up with some
way to control who gets to eat which berries. On one proposal, gatherers may pick
as many berries as they like and have ownership claims to any berries they pick.
However, this scheme will lead to a tragedy of the commons scenario and the
eventual death of the tribe. Instead, the tribe could opt for a system by which
gatherers can take up to 100 berries, but no more. This prevents a tragedy of the
commons, but is problematic since on some days gatherers end up in the wrong
place and get no berries, whereas on others they hit their limit easily. This prompts a
third possibility in which gatherers can pick up 200, but must give half of their crop
to a communal pot to distribute to those who are unlucky.
On each of these differing schemes gatherers have very different property claims.
On the second proposal it is simply not true to say that people have any property
claim at all to berries they picked after taking 100. Thus the tribal elders do them no
wrong at all if they take these excess berries off a hunter. The claim that individuals
have no claim to goods they wrongly acquire forms part of the Lockean treatment of
natural property. On Locke’s view people have no claim to acquisitions which
violate the proviso that they must leave ‘enough and as good for others’ (Locke
2008, p. 20). Acquisitions which do not meet this proviso do not even generate valid
property claims which are then overridden; they simply have no moral status at all.
In precisely the same way, on the final scheme gatherers have no property claim on
their entire crop of berries. Instead the process of the elders taking half is part of
what makes the claims of property exist in the first place. Note again that it is not
true that gatherers have even a pro-tanto claim on their entire 200 berries, which is
then overridden on the basis of other principles.3 Indeed, the gatherers could move
to an entirely collectivised system under which no individual ever had any property
claim at all to a berry, in much the same way as no farmer has any claim at all to a
piece of common land.
This simplified case is analogous to state taxation on the conventionalist view of
property. It is this sense that Murphy and Nagel suggest that taxation cannot, even in
principle, violate property rights. The example of the gatherers should be distinguished
2 For discussions of the indeterminacy of libertarian rights see the discussion between Fried (2004,
2005), Otsuka et al. (2005).
3 Many might have intuitions which suggest that the gatherers do at least have some claim to the berries
they picked, since they expended labour to get them, but this is just to say that there are at least some good
arguments to reject Murphy and Nagel’s purely conventionalist view or to think that one important




from another case where the right to exercise political power is in play. It is of course
true, as Tomasi suggests, that our ability to influence political decisions is shaped by
convention. For instance, in the U.K. votes are counted by a first-past-the-post system,
whereas in Germany votes are counted proportionally. It is therefore true that one’s
right to influence power is violated if one’s vote is not counted in the proportional
calculations in Germany, but not true in the U.K. because of the differing conventions.
It therefore might seem, as Tomasi suggests, that the right to vote is conventional in the
same way as property. However, this is incorrect. This is because citizens have an
individual claim to having a say in governance. This claim is theoretically prior to
conventions. Our political conventions are supposed to instantiate this claim rather
than create it. For this reason, a system which denied citizens the vote is not at all
analogous to one which collectivises property.
Therefore, I believe that Murphy and Nagel’s argument cannot be dismissed in the
way that Tomasi suggests. If one accepts a conventional view of property, it is not
true that taxation can violate a property right claim. It is important to note what does,
and does not, follow from this. It certainly does not follow that Tomasi’s market
democracy has been refuted, since there may well be highly plausible reasons to
favour conventions which allow private property to those which collectivise
property. I will turn to these arguments in the following section. What does follow is
that the effect on property rights is not part of the calculus when assessing various
possible schemes of taxation ranging from the very low rates of laissez-faire regimes
to the much heavier regimes of property owning democracies. Indeed, Tomasi cannot
even object to the collectivised economy of a liberal socialism on these grounds,
since on this set of conventions no individual could have legitimate claim to the
means of production. The task is to work out which property conventions best
promote various values, whereas at times Tomasi suggests that an important
advantage of market democracy is that it respects property rights, whereas social
democratic regimes infringe them. Defending markets on these rights-based grounds
is only open to defenders of a pre-societal conception of property. Critically, as we
have seen this is a strategy Tomasi rejects.
Undermining the Connection Between Markets and Agency
In this section I subject Tomasi’s claim that market economies maximise the ability
of citizens to be responsible self-authors to critical scrutiny. As noted, Tomasi’s
core claim is that markets provide citizens with more choices then are available
under state managed regimes, and that choice promotes someone’s agency in the
relevant sense.
I will accept that markets do indeed promote choice, but will question whether
the kinds of choices promoted by market societies do in fact promote agency in the
relevant sense. I will suggest two problems for this link. The first I term valueless
agency, which occurs when citizens do indeed have control of some aspect of their
lives but not in ways that foster self-authorship. The second problem I term the
illusion of agency, which occurs when citizens appear to have control over their
lives but do not, a situation which can have seriously detrimental consequences.
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Valueless Agency
As I noted above, central to Tomasi’s defence of free market politics is the fact that
markets give individuals an expanded realm of choice in which to shape their
economic lives. In this section, I argue that in many cases which are central to
economic lives the existence of choice provides no real opportunities to self
develop. Instead, these extra choices might frustrate development by taking up the
time and mental resources which might otherwise be used on personal projects that
do allow individuals to develop their moral powers.
To show an example of choices which do not promote agency, consider the choice
of which road to get to a given destination. It might be that the government has only
constructed one road, and therefore everyone has to take the same path. No one has
any choice to think about before travelling between A and B. Alternatively, it might
the case that there are many different roads to take. Some are motorways that get one
to the destination quickly but boringly, others go via historic towns, others via areas
of natural beauty, and so forth. In this case, there is a choice about how to travel
between A and B, and this choice develops and reflects a person’s ability to live as an
agent, at least to some degree. In a third case, there is only really one road that it is
rational to take, but it is just very difficult to find the right one because the maps and
road signs are horrendously unclear, let us call this the ‘spaghetti junction’ option.4
While trying to find the right way out of spaghetti junction does indeed involve
difficult choices, no one could reasonably be said to have an interest in living such
that they are required to make such choices on a regular basis.
Option one in this case represents how Tomasi would like us to think about
economic life in a social democratic society. While there are no difficult decisions
to make about pensions and healthcare, the very lack of these decisions denies
citizens the ability to shape an important part of their lives. He therefore commends
market societies as being more like option two. Market societies offer a variety of
occupational choices and choices about how to structure healthcare, education and
pensions in ways that develop and express a person’s considered choices. To
illustrate the sense in which economic decisions might be linked to personal projects
in this way, Tomasi offers the rich example of Amy, a small business owner. Amy
we are told is a college dropout who has an entry-level job as a pet groomer:
Dreaming of owning a business of her own, Amy saves her money, builds a
sterling credit rating, wins a bank loan, and finally opens her own pet shop
(Amy’s Pup-in-the-Tub). What does it mean to Amy to walk into her shop
each morning, or, when leaving after a particularly long day, to look back and
read her name up on the sign? (Tomasi 2012, p. 66).
This example is compelling, and highlights a serious worry with many existing
conceptions of liberal egalitarian justice. It seems highly implausible for defenders
of social democratic conceptions of justice to deny the existence of a serious moral
cost if small scale entrepreneurial decisions like Amy’s are prohibited. Of course,
this does not settle the argument in favour of allowing the existence of small
4 For foreign readers, this refers to a notoriously confusing and overcrowded junction in the U.K.
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businesses. Defenders of highly statist approaches might suggest that the egalitarian
benefits of communal ownership outweigh the loss to prospective entrepreneurs. It
is also worth pointing out that defenders of left-wing proposals such as Universal
Basic Capital or property-owning democracy often emphasise the fact that these
schemes might promote people’s abilities to run a small business. Nevertheless,
Tomasi has offered a powerful argument in favour of a specific set of economic
liberties, despite the inequality of resources these liberties may produce.
However, what is more in doubt is his belief that this kind of freedom extends to
decisions about provision of important goods such as healthcare or pensions.
Tomasi again suggests that financial decisions have a vital link to agency, he writes:
Questions about long term financial planning require that people think seriously
about the relation between the person that each is at one moment to the person
one will become many years in the future…. Economic decisions require that
people assess their most basic values, and in light of this assessment, set
themselves on a course of life that is their own (Tomasi 2012, p. 80).
In contrast, I suspect that in many cases financial freedom is more like the
spaghetti junction alternative. Consider the American experience of 401(k) retirement
plans (see for instance Mottola and Utkus 2003). A 401(k) refers to a move towards a
more privatised system in which employees invest their funds in a personal pot. This
move has certainly expanded the choices available to savers. They can invest in
shares, foreign currency and a variety of other inventive financial products. However,
a Schwab (2014) U.S. national survey found serious confusion amongst citizens
about how 401(k)s operate. Finally, no discussion of 401(k)s would be complete
without noting their catastrophic decline in value during the recent economic
downturn.5 Again, an important part of this story is that individuals simply had no
idea that they were risking their retirement plans in this way. The same Schwab
(2014) survey suggested that a large proportion of savers had no idea their money
was at risk, instead believing that expected pay-outs were somehow guaranteed.
For our purposes, this matters for two reasons. First it reinforces the extent to
which citizens’ did not understand their options. Presumably citizens who do not
understand their choices cannot possibly be expressing or developing their moral
powers by making them. Second, the evidence suggests what citizens really want in
this case is whatever options gets a guaranteed pay-out. People did not want to take
a risk with their retirement, but many were doing just that. To somewhat force this
example into my analogy, the vast majorities they want the motorway to a minimum
pension but cannot find the way onto this because of the complexity in the system.
In many ways, the above problems might be thought to be specific to various
schemes, and thus defenders of market conceptions are entirely at liberty to simply
argue in favour of a better designed privatised market. Tomasi and others would also
wish to point to several serious failures with government-run approaches. However,
these various problems point to deeper features of privatised services. Many choices
about healthcare, pensions and other services provided by social democratic states
5 See, for instance, VanDerhei (2009). This estimates 25 % losses for those with average to large style
401(k) accounts.
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are highly complex and technical. It is true that there are many decisions about
healthcare which express a person’s goals and plans, for instance whether to have
surgery to preserve sports functioning that risks future mobility or how to structure
lifetime consumption through pensions versus current consumption. But many
decisions do not have this character. In standard health cases, the patient will simply
wish to cure a specific illness or complaint, likewise many individuals will simply
want to ensure they have a pension that guarantees a reasonable minimum. The
complexity comes in achieving these ends. In his classic essay, ‘Uncertainty and the
welfare economics of medical care’ Arrow (1963) noted the asymmetric information
possessed by consumers of healthcare and by its providers (doctors/hospitals and
insurance companies). In the healthcare cases, expert knowledge is often required to
make even basic judgements about what is required. In addition, patients are not
often in the best frame of mind to make a cool and calculated decision about what
level of care to buy. This might be because they are currently impaired, or because of
the emotional importance of healthcare, few would haggle with a doctor over the cost
of their child’s treatment. Thus, decisions about healthcare are often not a vehicle for
self-development. Instead they are deeply stressful choices made without adequate
information, and the predictable effect of individualising them is to make most
individuals worse off.
In light of these various considerations, I believe there is a strong case to be made
that many individuals’ ability to be a responsible self-author is promoted by taking
away significant choices about healthcare, savings and pensions (and indeed many
other decisions). This is because individual choice about provision of these basic
services promotes valueless agency. Citizens genuinely do have choices, but these
choices are just about how to navigate a complex and potentially risky option set.
Removing many of these decisions from citizens would in fact promote, rather than
hinder, citizens’ abilities to make choices that really do reflect their values and
conceptions of the good.
To illustrate, return to Tomasi’s example of Amy. Consider the differences in
Amy’s story in cases where she lives in a laissez-faire economy, as opposed to a
mixed economy with government provision of many key services. Amy will have to
purchase insurance for her business, and given it is the source of her income her
pension and healthcare will depend largely or entirely (depending on the specifics of
the market regime in question) on her businesses success. This, I contend, is likely
to raise the stakes of her decision in ways which are deeply uncomfortable for Amy.
Indeed, the fact that in a market economy one’s ability to provide a pension and
healthcare depend upon one’s success might well diminish the attractiveness of
starting up a business for small time entrepreneurs like Amy. After all, the reason
one would have a safety net is to encourage risk taking like walking a tightrope.
Indeed, it is notable that the numbers of start-up businesses is lower in the U.S. than
countries with more expansive welfare systems such as Britain, Israel, and Canada
(Wimberley 2011). Being forced to control her health insurance and retirement plan
might also undermine her ability to run her business. As I noted above, decisions
about how to invest for the future and providing healthcare choices are complex.
Every day spent sorting these issues is one less day that Amy is spending controlling
the features of her business that really reflect her own preferences and values.
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Another important aspect of failures of privatised healthcare and pensions is that
outcomes are, almost invariably, worst for the worst off. Returning to my examples
drawn from America above, it is those who are poor, self-employed or those that
have pre-existing conditions who have fared worse in the current semi-privatised
system. This is evinced in comparative charts of care, showing that while some in
the U.S. enjoy the very best levels of healthcare, the worst-off fare worse than
individuals in other OECD countries that have a social safety net (Pear 2008). This
differential care has serious consequences, the gap between the life expectancy of
the richest quintile versus the poorest has grown significantly over recent years, and
is now almost a decade.6 Indeed, significantly given Tomasi’s argument, the life
expectancy of the very worst off groups has shown almost no increase over the past
decades, a scenario not replicated in countries with more egalitarian healthcare
arrangements (Tavernise 2012).
The tendency for privatised safety nets to do badly for the worst-off follows from
some deep-rooted aspects of their situation in our society. Most obviously, the
worst-off lack resources, and healthcare and pensions are expensive. More subtly,
the worst-off in society tend to have a lower quality education than those more
privileged. Given, as I argued above, success in privatised systems requires the
ability to acquire and process a large amount of complex data, these kinds of
information inequalities are extremely worrying. The fact that the worst-off are
likely to bear the brunt of the downsides of privatisation is deeply problematic for
Tomasi given the broadly Rawlsian framework he adopts. In particular, he accepts
the principle that inequalities are only justifiable if they are to the advantage of the
worst-off. If the worst-off will predictably lack the resources, information and skills
to benefit from the privatisation of key services he would therefore be committed to
allowing the state to run these institutions.
The Illusion of Agency
In this section, I outline a further reason to be sceptical of Tomasi’s claim that
markets develop the moral powers of citizens. I refer to this problem as the illusion
of agency. By this, I refer to cases in which society and the individual in question
treat choices as resulting from an agent’s control, but in fact this is not the case. I
will suggest that this kind of illusion of agency is common within current liberal
societies and would be even more pronounced in various kinds of market
democratic society outlined by Tomasi. I believe the illusion of agency to be a
general problem with Tomasi’s account, but will outline my argument through a
consideration of his discussion of equality of opportunity.
When outlining Rawls’ principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO), Tomasi
correctly suggests that this principle allows inequalities so long as they are to the
benefit of the worst-off. This draws on an often unnoticed part of Rawls’ account, in
which he qualifies the two principles in light of various constraints. Thus, whereas
the most often quoted version of FEO states that ‘social and economic inequalities
6 A particularly striking trend is the large gaps in life expectancy of males between those of low income
and high income. See Deaton (2003), p. 117.
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are to be arranged so that they are attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls 1973, p. 83, 302), the qualified
version is altered to ‘an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of
those with the lesser opportunity’ (Rawls 1973, p. 303). This is, on the face of it, a
significant revision. The first statement, which we might refer to as the strict
egalitarian reading of FEO would prohibit any basic structure in which certain social
classes predictably had more opportunities than others. The second, maximin,
reading of FEO would in principle permit very wide inequalities of opportunity
provided all were to the benefit of the worst off.7
After making this theoretical distinction, Tomasi offers several arguments to show
how, on this maximin conception, a variety of market democratic conceptions could be
shown to be compatible with the requirements of FEO (see Tomasi 2012, pp. 237–247).
Most significantly, the possibility of economic growth allows the creation of many
more opportunities than is possible in a stagnant economy. Further, rising incomes
gives workers more power to bargain about their job conditions and role in the firm.
One possible, and I believe at least partially correct, response to Tomasi’s
arguments is a broadly empirical one. We should note that while economic growth
does indeed tend to produce resources and a widening variety of jobs and other
occupations, these advantages do not in our world tend to flow to the least advantaged
in society. Instead, current economic trends have created a large class of people
working highly routine and monotonous jobs in the service sector. These jobs are
often low paid, with the result that the real wage of the lowest earners is in fact
remaining constant or perhaps decreasing.8
However, I believe there are deeper reasons to object to Tomasi’s view.
Specifically, I believe that Tomasi’s account would create a serious problem of
illusory agency for the worst-off. To show this, imagine a society in which equality
of opportunity (on the egalitarian conception) was perfectly realised. In this society,
it would therefore be true that any two individuals of similar ability would have an
equal chance of achieving any particular desirable position. As defenders of the
egalitarian conception of FEO recognise, this ideal is more or less impossible in
practice. The most significant obstacle would appear to be the existence of tight-nit
family units. Rawls himself writes that ‘It seems then that even when FEO is
satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between individuals’ which
prompts him to ask the question ‘is the family to be abolished then?’ (Rawls 1973,
p. 511). For the sake of argument though, imagine a society in which not only was
FEO perfectly realised, but that (even more implausibly) all instances of bad brute
luck that might affect an individual’s job chances had been eliminated.
One significant virtue of this society would be that every citizen would know that
their particular place in the economic scheme could be traced back to either their
own decisions or their own talents.9 This connection between choices and results is
7 This distinction is explored in detail by Pogge (1989).
8 See for instance the U.K. government report that notes an increase in employment both in the higher
paid end of the spectrum and an even more marked increase towards the lower end (Mcintosh 2013).
9 Indeed, given the relatively arbitrary nature of talents some bioethicists suggest that to ensure that
citizens are truly responsible for one’s place in a hierarchy the state should equalise natural inequalities as
well. See, for example, Feeney (2006).
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of significant value in developing those individuals’ abilities to be self-authors.
Those individuals who are successful, and who hold desirable positions, can look
back and see the importance of earlier choices which directly led to their current
status. Even those individuals who would rather have different jobs benefit from this
kind of equality of opportunity. They can trace their position back to their own
choices and must come to accept responsibility for their lives.
Contrast a society with egalitarian FEO with a market democratic society in
which there is much more luck involved in getting the very best positions. This luck
would be introduced in several forms, and would depend in part upon the precise
character of the market regime in question. Most obvious is parental income. As I
noted earlier, a robust body of research indicates that parental income is a strong
predictor of entrance into elite colleges and other desirable positions. Another way
luck will enter the system is through the choices of employers. In most social
democratic conceptions, strict laws exist designed to ensure that employers only act
on the basis of job-specific criteria. These laws are often criticised from the Right on
the grounds of restricting the liberty of firms to hire as they wish, a critique Tomasi
broadly endorses. On a market democratic conception these protections would be
correspondingly weaker. He writes that:
The regime type I call democratic laissez-faire, by contrast, relies more purely
on the market in pursuit of the good of formal equality of opportunity. Under
that regime type, business owners have wide freedom to hire and promote
workers by whatever criteria they choose—even when such decisions may
reasonably be said to be based on race, gender, religious beliefs, sexual
orientation, or aesthetic judgements about a person’s ‘looks’ (Tomasi 2012,
p. 241).
Two important features of this conception are that, firstly citizens might lose out
on a job opportunity for reasons not even remotely under their control (such as their
race or gender), and second, the wide variety of permissible reasons for not being
hired means that citizens will not know on what grounds they failed to get the job,
and whether these reasons were connected to their ability to do the job even in the
ideal case.
To show the importance of this concern with market democracy, imagine
someone much like Amy, but whose economic projects require many more
competitively awarded grants or positions. Amelia wishes to become a dentist and
open her own studio catering to a specific condition that she herself suffered with as
a child. She is also a member of the worst-off group in society. Just as with Amy, we
can see a close connection here between Amelia’s economic goals and her
conception of self and on-going projects. However, unlike Amy, Amelia’s life plan
requires she wins various competitions before she can achieve her goals. There are
very good reasons to require dentists to have a long training period, and also to
ensure that dentists have sufficient skill and ability. This implies that dental training
will be apportioned by some kind of process, and individuals cannot simply choose
to set up a successful dental practice in the way that Amy set up her pup in the tub
store. Now imagine that Amelia, living in a market democratic society, failed in her
life plan. She might have not been admitted to college, or failed to do well enough
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there to get follow-on dental training, or perhaps she was unable to pay for the long
training contract and failed to get one of the private bursaries available.
How must Amelia look back on her failure? It might be that her failing in her life
goal is her own responsibility, and could have been rectified by harder study.
However this is very far from certain. It might be true that Amelia’s school was
considerably worse than others on offer, perhaps for financial reasons, and thus that
she never really stood a chance in the application procedure to university. It might
also be true that the amount of money her parents had was more directly important,
perhaps because the private university had an incentive to accept richer students
who would donate more. It might be that she did not get the job because many of the
committees involved were racist or misogynist in some way. She might not have got
her dream job because a dentist who was hiring found another candidate more
attractive and hired her on this basis.
The existence of unequal schooling and laissez-faire hiring thus seriously limits
the sense in which Amelia is able to understand and (at least in principle) have
altered the causes of significant events in her life. I believe that this uncertainty
about the relevant reasons for hiring is itself undermining of Amelia’s ability to live
as a responsible self-author and develop her moral powers. One important part of
agency is knowing what were the causes of significant events within one’s life, and
understanding how one might have acted differently (and should act differently
should similar circumstances occur again).
Tomasi himself recognises this link. When discussing the moral power of the
Rational, he writes that ‘People are life agents and their agency matters. As
responsible-self authors, they have the capacity to realistically assess the options
before them, and in light of this assessment, to set standards for a life that each
deems worth living’ (Tomasi 2012, p. 40). The importance of realistic assessment is
critical here. I believe that in our world (and perhaps particularly in the U.S.) many
citizens have highly unrealistic assessments of their options. One important reason
is that, culturally, many believe in a more egalitarian conception of equality of
opportunity and believe that this kind of equality exists in their own society. The
thought that anyone can succeed provided they are willing to work hard is essence
of the so-called ‘American Dream.’ These beliefs are at stark odds with the actual
chances of circumstances of life for many citizens. For instance, the Sutton Trust
reports that upward mobility is relatively low in the U.S. compared to many other
European countries (with the exception of the U.K.). Their 2008 report argues that
the data suggests that ‘those at the bottom of the income ladder in early life are far
less likely to earn higher incomes as adults when compared with children from
richer homes’ (Sutton 2008, p. 1).
This discrepancy between believed opportunities and actual opportunities is
deeply problematic for the development of the moral powers, since it undermines
the extent to which citizens’ lives are being lived on the basis of a realistic
assessment of their actual options and their prospective chances of success in these
options. Given her (relatively, if not absolutely) bad start in life and the inegalitarian
nature of her society, Amelia’s plans of becoming one of the few dentists in her
society are thus not realistic enough to count as a development of her moral powers.
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How might Amelia be compensated for this lack of opportunity and
corresponding ability to develop as a self -author? One way is through resources,
but we have seen that this is insufficient to meet the requirements of FEO, even on
the maximin reading. Instead, Tomasi argues that a combination of economic
growth and a pluralistic labour market will provide even the losers with more
opportunity than they would have had in a more heavily state-run economy. In
Amelia’s case it might be true that the various jobs open to her without a college
degree are of a much higher quality and interest than they would have been in a
stagnant state-run economy. However, this does not seem like the optimum scenario
for Amelia. After all, her conception of the good led her to want to be a dentist.
Even if other options are just as rewarding from some objective point of view they
would not be as rewarding for Amelia. The choice is one between a social
democratic World A in which Amelia has a fair chance at achieving her dream of
being a dentist, versus a market democratic World B in which she has an even better
chance of achieving her dream of getting some improved lower wage job ‘janitor
?’. In both worlds, we can reasonably imagine that Amy would desire to become a
dentist, thus in World B her compensatory opportunities will always be second
bests, and Amelia will believe that she failed in her dream due to mistakes, or that
she was not sufficiently talented.
If accurate, this suggests that market democracy faces an unpleasant choice. It
can support stark inequalities of opportunity (that benefit the worst-off) and a
culture of aspiration, but accept that many citizens like Amelia will live lives full of
disappointment and have a problematically misguided understanding of their real
opportunities. Alternatively, it could try to take measures to ensure that those from
poorer backgrounds had diminished aspirations and more realistically made plans
based on the (near) certainty of them being able to achieve only a limited range of
jobs. This option would reinforce the ability of worse-off citizens to have a realistic
assessment of their options, but would presumably carry severe costs. This kind of
society, in which many citizens of ability and talent knowingly accept their
diminished opportunities, surely violates the spirit, if not the letter, of justice as
fairness. More significantly, it is a society which seems profoundly unattractive.
The problems faced by Amelia above demonstrate the problem of the illusion of
agency. She believed her place in the overall social hierarchy would be responsive
to her own effort, but in fact her success or failure was determined by her parent’s
income, her race, gender or sexual attractiveness. I suggested that she was in many
respects worse off than someone who accepted that her abilities to succeed were not
under her control. Belief that she was the cause of her success inevitably means that
she falsely believes she was the cause of her own failure. This might imply that she
believes it is legitimate for others to treat her as a failure in ways that are clearly
wrong given she had little control over events. This kind of illusion of agency
occurs frequently within capitalist economies. People with high incomes routinely
act as if they must have done something to earn these rewards relative to the
unemployed, but in many cases their different incomes can be traced entirely back
to shifts in the economy and unpredictable changes in consumer demands. This
worry is in a sense inevitable. In no society will success be entirely controlled by the
agent, but they do suggest a compelling reason to try and link success to choice, and
Markets, Choice and Agency 359
123
I have suggested this in turn gives a reason to favour egalitarian educational
institutions and much stricter control of the labour market than Tomasi favours.
Conclusion
This paper has only considered a small selection of the various rich arguments
Tomasi offers in defence of market democracies. It therefore cannot be taken as a
full defence of the more traditional welfare state against his critique. I have, though,
suggested that Tomasi’s characterisation of free market societies and their
connection to political agency is defective in certain respects. In particular, I have
attempted to undermine the picture of economic choices as one which necessarily
promotes an individual’s ability to live in accordance with a plan of life they have
devised. Some economic choices really do spring from an individual’s conception of
themselves in this way. However, many other economic choices do not have this
character. Instead, choices can be deeply confusing and made under conditions in
which many agents will lack sufficient understanding to properly select their goals.
This valueless agency means that citizens in a free market will have to spend
valuable time trying to secure basic necessities instead of spending time pursuing
their own projects. Worse, in many free market societies individuals will believe
themselves to be responsible for much more of their circumstances than is really
true. This illusion of agency undermines their ability to properly understand and
alter their circumstances.
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